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RECENT DECISIONS
Administrative Law -

Notice of Special Assessment -

Action

in equity to set aside special assessments. The City of Milwaukee
levied special assessments for street improvements against property
owned by the plaintiff. Abutting landowners were given notive of the
assessments by publication, in compliance with the City Charter which
provided that notice of an assessment for street improvement benefits
was sufficient if given by publication.1 Plaintiff brought this action
against the City alleging that: 1) it had no actual notice of the assessment until it was too late to protect it; 2) notice by publication was
inadequate to comply with the requirements of due process of law ;2
and that, therefore, the City Charter provisions were unconstitutional. 3
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held for the defendant (City).
Wisconsin Electric Power Company v. Milwaukee, 263 Wis. 111, 56
N.W.2d 784 (1953).
In 1955, plaintiff obtained leave of the court to plead over and
served an amended complaint. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin again
held for the defendant. 4 Plaintiff's prime reason for filing the amended
complaint was that subsequent to the decision of the principal case,
the Supreme Court of the United States again considered the sufficiency of notice given by publication and broadened a principle which
it had previously announced.
The case upon which plaintiff based its amended complaint involved an action in equity to enjoin the enforcement of lien claims.
A city made street improvements upon real estate owned by a railroad
and obtained liens for the work done. The railroad was reorganized
under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act and the court issued an order
directing creditors to file their claims by a prescribed date or be denied
participation. The railroad was required to send copies of the court
order to mortgage trustees and to all creditors who had already appeared in court. Other creditors had to depend for their notice on
publication of the order in newspapers. The city never saw the published notices and consequently its lien claims were never filed in the
reorganization. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed
the trial court and held that the notice by publication was insufficient. 5
In its opinion the Court relied on the case of A'Iullane v. Central Hanover Fire Insurance Company.6 This case arose when a trust company
published notice of judicial hearings on settlement of accounts of the
1 CITY OF MILWAUKEE CHARTER, §§11.20, 12.07,
2 WIS. CONsT. Art. I, §13.

and 14.24.

3 Supra, n. 1.
4 Wisconsin Electric Power Company v. Milwaukee, 272 Wis. 575, 76 N.W.2d
341 (1955).
New York v. New York, N.H. & H. Ry., 344 U.S. 293 (1953).
GMullane v. Central Hanover Fire Insurance Company, 339 U.S. 306 (1949).
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trustee of a common trust fund. The attorney representing the interests
of the beneficiaries in the income of the fund objected on the ground
that the notice by publication was inadequate to afford due process
of law under the Constitution. 7 The Court held that the notice by
publication was insufficient and stated the doctrine that publication affords sufficient notice where the names and addresses of
interested persons are unknown but does not afford notice compatible
with the requirements of due process where the names and addresses
of interested persons are known or could be ascertained with reasonable diligence. What the Supreme Court of the United States did in
the New York, N.H. & H. Ry. case" was to extend the doctrine of the
Mullane case 9 to another fact situation. What plaintiff attempted to do
in the principal case was to persuade the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
to extend the Mullane doctrine to cases of notice of a special assessment. The Wisconsin Court refused to do so, and was entirely correct
in its refusal.
The rules concerning notice in cases involving tax assessments
stand clearly and distinctly apart from the rules concerning notice
in all other types of cases. No attempt should have been made to draw
an analogy between notice in a bankruptcy case and notice in a tax
assessment case.
Tax cases stand apart because the power given the taxing authorities is broad, and therefore less notice need be given in tax cases than
is required in other types of cases. The Wisconsin Court illustrated
this when it set forth some fundamental principles with reference to
the subject of taxation in the case of Milwaukee County v. Dorsen,10
where it said:
"It is well settled by our decisions that the legislature has
plenary power to deal with the whole question of taxation subject to the constitutional limitations that taxes can be imposed
only for public purposes and that the rule of taxation must be
uniform. Its power is supreme in the selection of objects of
taxation, determining the amount of taxes to be levied thereon
and the purposes thereof, .

. .,

and in devising the machinery

for assessing the taxable property imposing taxes thereon, and
in collecting and disbursing the same."
Another indication of the broad power of the taxing authorities in the
area of taxation is the presumption which prevails in favor of the
regularity of the acts of taxing authorities. 1
Since tax cases stand apart from other cases in this manner, the
7

U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV, §1.

s Supra, n.

5.

9 Supra, n. 6.
' .Milwaukee County v. Dorsen, 208 Wis. 637, 242 N.\.
11Ibid.

515, 640 (1932).
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form of notice required to be given in tax cases is not as strict and
personal as the form required in other types of cases. It is generally
recognized that a landowner is entitled to and must be given actual or
constructive notice of an assessment at some time during the pro2
ceedings.1
"Due process of law, in the constitutional sense, is satisfied by
the giving of notice to the party of a proceeding in which his
rights may be affected, together with an opportunity to appear
therein and be heard."' 3
However, the notice need not be given at any set time but rather, it is
sufficient to sustain the assessment if given at any stage of the pro14
ceedings prior to a conclusive judgment.
Although there must be some notice given, this need not be served
personally. Constructive service, that is, any form of service other
than actual personal service,' 5 has been held sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of due process of law. The Supreme Court of the
United States recognized this in the case of Londoner v. Denvers
when it said:
"... the taxpayer shall have an opportunity to be heard, of
which he must have notice, either personal, by publication or by
a law fixing the time and place of hearing."
Thus, it appears that notice in tax assessment cases may be so general
as to rest only in the provisions of a statute, of which the taxpayer
is required to take notice. This has also been recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Cleveland, Cincinnati,
Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Backus,17 and by the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin in the Milwaukee County v. Dorsen case when it said:
"... notice, however, may be general and rest only in the provisions of the statutory law of which the taxpayer must take
notice."'s
Notice by statute is much less likely to reach the taxpayer than notice
by publication, and yet the courts uphold it as sufficient in tax cases,
so there can be no question of the sufficiency of notice by publication
in tax cases.
Still another indication of the manner in which tax cases stand
apart and the broad power of taxing authorities is the distinct liberality,
Realty Co. v. Olson, 210 Wis. 281, 246 N.W. 513 (1933).
13 Stone v. Little Yellow Drainage District, 118 Wis. 388, 394, 95 N.W. 405 (1903).
" McEveney v. Town of Sullivan, 125 Ind. 407, 25 N.E. 540 (1890).
15 Black, LAw DICTIONARY 1533 (4th ed. 1951).
16 Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385 (1908).
17 Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Backus, 154 U.S. 439
12Armory

(1894).

IsSupra, n. 10, at 641.
'9 Meggett v. Eau Claire, 81 Wis. 326, 51 N.W. 566 (1892).
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from the point of view of the taxing authorities, which prevails
throughout all rules relating to notice of tax assessments. This is apparent in the rules relating to what a statute must prescribe in regard
to notice. The Wisconsin case of il'eggett v. Eau Claire held that the
charter of the City of Eau Claire was valid even though it did not
require notice to be given to the lot owner as to the amount of special
assessments with which the lots were charged. 19 It said that the due
process clause is not violated if the owner has an opportunity to question the validity of the amount of the special assessment either before
the amount is determined or in a subsequent proceeding for its collection. A subsequent case held that a city charter which contained no
provision for the giving of any notice either actual or constructive was
unconstitutional and void.20 However, this has been expressly overruled by the Armory Realty Company case which stated the rule in
Wisconsin to be that the failure of a statute specifically to require or
prescribe the method of giving notice does not render it unconstitutional. 2 1 This liberality in rules relating to notice of tax assessments
is also apparent in the rules relating to the form of notice that must
be given. It must conform substantially to the requirements of the
law providing therefor," but beyond this point there is much flexibility.
A Wisconsin case has held that the annual entry of an assessment on
the tax rolls is sufficient notice of the assessment, where no other
notice is required by law." Minor irregularities in a notice, such as a
mistake in or an omission of the name of a property owner will not
invalidate it, if it is otherwise correct and sufficient.' 4 It has also been
held that defects in the notice may be waived by the conduct of the
property owner.' 5 Notice which will disclose to persons of ordinary
intelligence in a general way what is proposed will suffice." However,
it should be noted that even under these liberal rules, a line must be
drawn at some point. The Wisconsin Court drew such a line in the
case of Boden v. Town of Lake in which it held a notice of special
assessment to be insufficient because it did not inform the property
owner that his property would be specially assessed, but implied that
the cost of the improvement would be paid by the whole town."
The basic reason why tax cases stand apart from other types of
cases in regard to the type of notice that must be given is that of tradition-

it has always been so.

Dietz v. Neenah, 91 \Vis. 422, 64 N.W. 299 (1895).
Supra, n. 12.
2People v. Smith, 216 N.Y. 95, 110 N.E. 174 (1915).
":3Hennessy v. Douglas County, 99 Wis. 129, 74 N.W. 983 (1898).
24 West Chicago Street Ry. v. People, 155 Ill. 299, 40 N.E. 599 (1895).
"5 Blake v. City of Spartanburg, 185 S.C. 398, 194 S.E. 124 (1937).
'"Escott v. Miami, 107 Fla. 273, 144 So. 397 (1932).
'7 Boden v. Town of Lake, 244 \Vis. 215, 12 N.W.2d 140 (1943).
2'
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"..

. it has always been recognized by the courts that in

matters of assessment and taxation, the same character of notice
is not required as in ordinary actions." 2 (emphasis added)
A second, and perhaps the most practical reason why tax cases
stand apart, is that of public policy. The Wisconsin court recognized
this public policy in the Milwaukee County v. Dorsen case 29 when
it said that:
"The proper discharge of governmental functions depends upon
the regular collection of taxes, and the machinery of administration by which taxes are collected is often in the hands of those
untutored in the law, courts should not inject into the plan set
up by the legislature technicalities which may result in depriving
the government of the funds necessary for the discharge of its
functions."
The courts have decided that this public interest must prevail over
the interest of the individual in having his constitutional rights preserved.
A second aspect of this public policy is apparent in cases involving
special assessments for street improvements, such as the principal
case. Special assessments are:
"....

those special and local impositions upon property in the im-

mediate vicinity of municipal improvements, such as grading
and paving streets, improving harbors or navigable rivers within
the limits of the municipality, ..

for improvements, ...

,

which are necessary to pay

"30

This definition indicates that special assessments result from improvements made upon property which are crucial to the well-being of the
public. It is essential to the well-being of the public that roads and
sidewalks be kept in good repair. Not a day passes in which nearly
every citizen does not make use of roads or sidewalks in his chosen
municipality. A break or obstruction in any part of one of them would
destroy its usefulness and result in the greatest inconvenience to the
general public. To require a personal notice to the landowner before
the repairs could be made would too greatly handicap and delay the
municipality in performing this vital public function. Even though in
some specific instances it may be possible, and even easy, for the
municipality to give personal notice to the landowners, the rule must
be designed to fit the general situation and not the exceptional one.
This was recognized in a Wisconsin case which held that, as regards
sidewalk assessments, provision for notice to the property owner before construction or repair is not essential to the validity of a statute
26 R.C.L., TAXATION, §303, at 345.
29 Supra, n. 10, at 644.
30 Hale v. Kenosha, 29 Wis, 599, 605 (1872).

28
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providing for the repair of sidewalks. 31 The reason given was that the
absence of sidewalks or the presence of defective sidewalks may be
a serious public inconvenience, if not a menace to life and limb, and
therefore a municipality may be clothed with power to build a walk
or repair an existing walk at once without notice to landowners. This
case went to the extent of saying that in such a situation the act of the
municipality is really an exercise of the police power.
A third reason why the rules concerning notice in tax cases stand
apart from the rules concerning notice in other cases was suggested
by the Court in the Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co.
case. 3 2 The Court suggested that owners of property who must file
schedules showing their taxable property with a tax assessment board,
know that they have a tax assessment pending and are bound to take
notice of the time and place fixed by a statute for a meeting of the
tax assessment board for the purpose of making assessments as much
so as parties who have a case pending in court are bound to take
notice of a statute fixing the time when the term opens for the disposition of cases, and that no personal notification is necessary to meet
the requirement of due process. Similarly, abutting lot owners where
special improvements have been made must as reasonable persons
know that special assessment proceedings are pending and notice by
publication of the time and place of assessment is sufficient. The class
of taxpayers being dealt with in special assessment cases are landowners, and they certainly should realize that street improvements have
to be paid for and that the common method of paying for them is by
special assessment.
The rules relating to notice in tax assessment cases stand clearly
and distinctly apart from such rules in other types of cases. Thus, the
Wisconsin Court rightly refused to apply a doctrine concerning notice
in bankruptcy cases to a tax assessment case.
HARRY

G. HOLZ

Publication of Court Room Proceedings By Television, PhotogSupreme Court of Colorado recently apraphy and Radio -The
proved the finding of a court appointed referee that Canon 35 of the
CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS should be revised. After a formal hearing, the referee recommended that with certain provisos the judge
should have the discretion to permit the use of cameras, radio, and
television instruments in court room proceedings. The provisos
would prohibit photographing or broadcasting the likeness or testimony of witnesses or of jurors if such parties express objections.
31 Lisbon Avenue Land Co. v. Town of Lake, 134 Wis. 479, 113 N.W. 1099 (1907).
32 Supra, n. 17.

